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· POSSIBILITY .AND PL UR.ALISM 
WILLIAM SA VERY 
I. THE FIELD OF MEANING 
PossIBILITY LIES WITHIN the field of meaning. This has been stated by several of the writers in this volume, including 
Professors Adams, Loewenberg, and Marhenke. Professor 
Mackay has said that no analysis of facts discloses possibility. Pos-
sibility is not an attribute of the ,actual nor a relation between 
actuals. It is true that we, as thinkers, characterize the actual as 
also possible, but this is only when we relate the actual to a wider 
field of meaning. Consequently, it is necessary to characterize the 
field of meaning, and especially the larger part of this field, namely, 
the field of reference. 
There is direct experience. There is focalized acquaintance with 
parts of this experience, which parts are facts or data. There is also 
a descriptive characterization of these facts, as when I say, "This 
is green," or "This is on that." Such a description may be said to 
be a meaning in the widest sense of meaning, although the descrip-
tion does not step beyond the facts. Such descriptions do not em-
ploy variables. 
Most of our thoughts, however, refer beyond themselves. They 
have objects, or at least objectives, and these objects or objectives 
are meanings which constitute the field of reference. They embrace 
everything that we think about intelligently which lies beyond the 
duration block. They include, first, my past; second, my future; 
third, other minds; fourth, the physical world; fifth, the super-
natural world (if any); and sixth, :fictions, Fictions include (a) 
false propositions, whether believed, disbelieved, supposed, or 
doubted; (b) questions which would be truly answered in the nega-
tive; (c) commands never executed; (d) wishes unfulfilled; and 
( e) downright :fictitious things, such as Prince Genji and the mock 
turtle. In another paper I have explained the nature of references 
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. beyond the duration block.1 J ames's and Dewey's account of refer. 
ence as restricted to the future is entirely inadequate. The refer. 
ence backward to the past is necessary on J ames's own theory, 
since, according to him, we say at the end of the process of verifica. 
tion, "This is what I meant." There are also references to other 
centers of experience, to an external world and to fictions, as 
already mentioned. I cannot enter here upon an extended descrip. 
tion of objective reference, but certain statements are necessary. 
My first thesis is : There are simple references beyond the dura-
tion block. When I abstract any relation or attribute, any predi. 
cate in short, it would have no meaning without a reference to 
"some" further content, the reference of the variable. In logical 
terms, every abstract propositional function includes the variable. 
For example, "with" is a relation and it is the nature of a relation 
to relate. To think of any relation as a non-relating relation, as 
Russell did in 1903 in his Principles, is absurd. If we abstract the 
relation from its specific terms we refer to "some" terms. We have 
the thought of something "with" something, x1Rx2 • If we abstract 
an attribute we have a reference to one term. Loudness has no 
meaning except as the loudness of something. Such references as 
these are simple references and since we abstract from facts we 
can always find examples by acquaintance or denotation. · 
My second thesis is: There is a genuine thought·synthesis in 
which we think of-two attributes or relations combined on the same 
variable. Take a very simple illustration. I may think not only 
that something is round and that something is red but I may also 
think that something is round and also red; that is, I may think 
of a round red thing. Now round red things are found in direct 
experience, but there are syntheses of this sort that go beyond such 
experience. Take the illustration of a purple fish. I can abstract 
the spatial form of a fish from the visual aspect of a goldfish in a 
pool and the purple from the visual aspect of a petunia growing 
beside the pool, and think of the combination of these two abstrac-
tions. It is true that I may also form an image of a purple fish, but 
this image is not a percept. In order to think of a perceptual purple 
fish I must thin~ o:f a combination of the content of the image with 
the vividness abstracted from some actual percept. Purple fishes 
1 "On the Nature of Objeetive Referenee," J owr. Philos., XXIII (1926), 
393-407. 
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doubtless exist. I remember having seen them in the aquarium but 
I cannot now find them in my experience; I cannot now denote 
them; they are objects of reference or meanings. 
My third thesis is: There are references not only to things that 
are, but also to things that are not. I can think of a purple fish but 
I can also think of a purple lotus in the sky. So far as meanings are 
concerned, man is the measure both of things that are and of things 
that are not. Some of these things are not now but were in the 
past. Others are not now but will be in the future. Still others have 
no being ,either in time or out of it; in every sense they are not; 
they are not things, if by a thing I mean anything that has being. 
There are no mock turtles. When I have the thought of a mock 
turtle I do not have the thought of what is actually a being. I can 
only say, paraphrasing Mr. G. E. Moore,2 I have the thought of 
that which, if it had being, would be a mock turtle. I cannot say, 
with Professor Loewenberg, that possibles are actual in the divine 
imagination. The divine imagination is only a reference to the 
possible worlds which are not actual at all. I cannot say, with Mr. 
Strong, that the Mad Hatter is actual in Lewis Carroll's story. 
There is the written story of the Mad Hatter; there are the words, 
Mad Hatter; there is the picture of the Mad Hatter; there is the 
image of the Mad Hatter ( copied I hope, from the original pic-
ture); there is the thought of the Mad Hatter; but there is no Mad 
Hatter. The Mad Hatter is not a being; he is not actual; he does not 
exist nor subsist; he is not real; the Mad Hatter is not a fact. It is 
the thought of him which is delightful, whimsical, and altogether 
charming. I cannot even say that the meaning is; there is only the 
thought of the meaning_:_the reference to the meaning. 
No philosophy which does not admit of reference to things which 
are not can possibly stand. When Royce makes all objective refer-
ence consist of a relation of one part of the absolute to another 
part, his theory is self-refuting. If there is any absolute, he must 
think of things that are not, since I am a part of the absolute and 
I think of things that are not. 
We have not yet reached the meaning of possibility, since the 
field of meaning contains both possibilities and impossibilities. If 
we identify possibility and meaning we must then distinguish, as 
2 Philosophiaal Studies, pp. 216 ff. 
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Professor Adams did, between genuine and spurious possibilities. 
Spurious possibility is not genuine, it is Pickwickian; it is impos-
sibility, the contradictory of possibility. My contention is only 
verbal, but I think it conduces to clearness to use the word possi-
bility with only one meaning. I shall therefore use the words mean-
ingful or significant for the wider sense, and dichotomize the signi-
ficant into the possible and the impossible. The significant is the 
sphere in which the possible falls. This sphere, when it goes beyond 
the actual, is a product of synthetic thought. If we do not restrict 
the word imagination to the production of an image, but use it in its 
popular sense of creative thought, we may endorse the following: 
"The gleam of an heroic act, 
Such strange illumination-
The Possible's slow fuse is lit 
By the imagination." 
II. THE POSSIBLE AND THE IMPOSSIBLE 
Historically, the primary locus of the meaning of the possible 
and the impossible is presumably the will. The impossible is what is 
willed but not effectuated. If an end is first willed and then 
achieved, it is said that it was possible at the time it was willed. The 
impossible, however, involves a conflict, a contradiction between 
the purpose and the outcome. 
Nevertheless, the meaning of the impossible has been generalized 
to include all contradictions and I shall confine my discussion to 
this generalized meaning. Unless the meaning can be stretched to 
include other incompatibles I shall define impossibility as contra-
diction. Hence : 
My fourth thesis is: Impossibility is contradiction. It has been 
maintained by certain philosophers that there is such a thing as 
synthetic incompatibility. Johnson3 says, 
if any determinate adjective characterizes a given substantive, then it is 
impossible that any other determinate under the same determinable should 
characterize the same substantive; e.g., the proposition that "this surface 
is red" is incompatible with the proposition "this [same] surface is blue." 
Professor Lovejoy4 says, 
I seem to myself to be unable to attach any consistent meaning to the state-
s Logic, I, 181. 4 The Revolt against Dualism, p. 139. 
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ment that one and the same surface not merely appears to different be-
holders to be, but actually is, both purple and green. 
He adds, however, 
Nevertheless, I am told by persons of logical acumen and practice in intro-
spective discrimination that they :find no difficulty whatever in thinking 
of such simultaneous dual or multiple coloring of an identical surface; and 
I feel bound to admit the possibility that they do in fact achieve this, to 
me, elusive feat. 
Professor Lovejoy seems to admit that the impossibility is an in-
consistency. But Johnson does not state whether it is an incon-
sistency or not. I wish to say, :first, that if it is not inconsistent I 
have difficulty in grasping the meaning of its being logically im-
possible. Secondly, I am one of those who are unable to :find any 
incompatibility. If instead of the determinable, color, we take the 
determinable, taste, there is no incompatibility between deter-
minates, since the same sip of coffee may be both sweet and bitter. 
If we take color, it seems to be only a matter of fact that a surface 
cannot be both red and blue in the same experience. There is a 
great difference between a red-blue surface and a round square. 
There is no contradiction in a circle inscribed in a square. The con-
tradiction arises through the notion of one and only one boundary 
and that boundary being both round and square, that is, both 
round and not-round. Now, if I presuppose that a surface has only 
one color that color cannot be both red and blue, but I do not need 
to make any such presupposition. The same surface may be red in 
one perspective and blue in another, and it is not logically impos-
sible that there should be fairies who could perceive the two per-
spectives combined. I shall continue to limit all impossibilities to 
contradictions. 
It has been denied that impossibilities fall within the range of 
significance. The answer to this has been elucidated by Professor 
Marhenke's admirable, as well as timely, analysis. Nevertheless, it 
might be maintained against him that each of two incompatible 
propositions has a meaning, but that there is no meaning when we 
try to put them together. Langford5 says, "we shall have to say 
that two incompatible propositions never do give rise by conjunc-
tion to a third proposition, and that this is precisely what it means 
5 Lewis and Langford, Symbolic Logia, p. 476. 
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for two propositions to be incompatible." I wish to support Pro-
fessor Marhenke's thesis by further argument. 
First, the reductio ad absurdum. There have been various at-
tempts to limit the range of significance that are untenable. Take 
first the classical attempt of Parmenides. We have four funda-
mental theses: (1) Being is. Granted, a tautology. (2) Not-being 
is not. Another tautology. ( 3) Thought of being is. Granted. ( 4) 
Thought of not-being is not. What is it you cannot think of, Par-
menides? Not-being. Do the words not-being have a meaning or 
not? If they do, then you have thought of it. If they do not, sub-
stitute a nonsense word for it-ogliwog. Then the theses are as fol-
lows: (1) Being is. (2) Ogliwog is not, or ogliwog is ogliwog. (3) 
Thought of being is. ( 4) Thought of ogliwog is not, or thought of 
ogliwog is ogliwog. It is safe to say that Parmenides' philosophy 
will not follow from these four theses. It is clear that we know the 
meaning of nothing-at-all. A pessimistic friend of my early philo-
sophic days once said to me, "If I could press a button and blow 
the universe, not into little bits (for they might reassemble again) 
but into nothingness, I wouldn't hesitate a moment to do it." I 
knew what he meant. Take Herbert Spencer, who said that infinite 
space is inconceivable, not because it is space but because it is in-
finite. Substitute a nonsense word: ogliwoggian space is incon-
ceivable. If- Spencer were an honest philosopher he would admit, 
"This is not what I meant." 
A similar dialectic applies to the classical Hindu illustration, 
the son of a barren woman, a clear contradictiol\. When I say that 
the son of a barren woman is impossible, I have the meanings, not 
only of son and of a barren woman but als_o of the son of a barren 
woman, since I say, not that a son is impossible, nor that a barren 
woman is impossible, but that the son of a barren woman is im-
possible. As J ames6 has said: 
We trunk of a thing ab=t which certain facts must obtain but we do not yet 
know how the thing would look when it is realized. The natural possibility 
or impossibility of the thing does not touch the question of its conceivability 
in this problematic way. "Round square," ''black-white thing," are absolutely 
definite conceptions. 
When I make the statement, "The proposition p is incompatible 
with the proposition q," obviously I have thought of an incom-
6 Principles of Psychology, I, 463. 
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patibility or a contradiction, and the meaning of this statement is a 
proposition, since a proposition and a complete meaning are one 
and the same. 
Secondly, it is easy enough to understand how a contradictory 
proposition is framed. Just as I frame a complex propositional 
function through the identity of the variables in "x is round" and 
"x is red," so I frame a complex propositional function through 
the identity of the variables in "x is round" and "x is square." 
Certainly, I am not acquainted with a round square. As James 
says, I ani thinking of it in a problematic way. But that is true of 
all objective references. I do not so much think of meanings as at 
them, but it happens that we use the word of instead of at. I think 
of a mock turtle; so I think of a round square. I once listened to a 
conversation between a small boy and his mother. The boy had 
previously asked his mother, "Would you be afraid of a bear out 
of a cage~" and then, "Would you be afraid of a bear in of a cage f' 
He then said, "Would you be afraid of a bear-out-of-a-cage-in-of-a-
cage ?" The mother's expression was one of perplexity. She said, 
"Child, what do you mean?" With an obvious tone of contempt, he 
replied, "I mean two things at once." He was wiser than his mother 
and some philosophers. 
Thirdly, if contradiction has no meaning then no proposition 
could be negatively verified, since in a negative verification we 
"spot" an inconsistency between a proposition and a fact. 
My fifth thesis is: Possibility means the absence of impossibility. 
In spite of the negative word, impossibility is the prior and posi-
tive conception. Possibility, as we have seen, lies within the field of 
meaning, and I may describe a meaning. But if you ask me whether 
the meaning is a consistent one I must look for contradictions. If 
I find the meaning exemplified in experience, then I know that 
there are no contradictions. If I cannot find it exemplified, I de-
velop my meaning fully and look for contradictions in the mean-
ing. If I find none I may then believe (rightly or wrongly) that 
the meaning is consistent. In any event, possibility means con-
sistency. I agree entirely with Professors Lenzen and Loewenberg 
in the identification of possibility and consistency. I would add 
that possibility as such is consistency, although o•f course in a par-
ticular example we must specify what the proposition is and with 
what other propositions, if any, we are comparing it. A proposi-
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tion may be possible in itself and yet not com-possible, to use Leib-
niz' term, with other propositions. I shall discuss this later. 
Professor Loewenberg has said that possibility is epistemic and 
Professor Adams that possibility is constitutive-an apparent con-
tradiction. I agree with both and I think they agree with each 
other. 'l'he whole field of significance, which includes both possi-
bility and impossibility, is the meaning of thought. Without a 
thinker, both possibility and impossibility would have no status. 
So far, possibility is epistemic. Once granted this field, the nature 
of impossibility and its difference from possibility belong to the 
field. In this sense they are constitutive. When I think of a contra-
diction I think of a as other than itself, and that a is other than 
itself is exactlywhat the principle of contradiction denies. Further, 
consistency is absence of contradiction, and since absence is never 
anything actual its status must always be the meaning of a thought. 
There is another meaning of contradiction, namely, the affirmation 
and denial of the same proposition; but this meaning is secondary. 
Further, this contradiction is not only possible; it takes place 
daily. I cannot, as a matter of fact, affirm and deny the same propo-
sition in the same breath, but the statement of this factual impos-
sibility is not the law of contradiction. I conclude: The contradic-
tion which is an impossibility is constitutive in the field of refer-
ence. I may remark parenthetically that the two diverse meanings 
of the a priori correspond to the two senses in which possibility and 
impossibility are epistemic and constitutive. We construct the en-
tire field of significance; that is the first meaning of the a priori. 
Secondly, we discriminate. by inspection the logical possibilities 
from the impossibilities therein; and this is the a priori of logical 
and mathematical analysis. 
In the conclusion of this section I wish to say a word about the 
apeiron. As the widest of all specifiables, the apeiron, if still signifi-
cant, is plainly "some being." Since this applies to everything, it 
admits of no actual contradictory; everything actual is an ex-
ample of it. It does, however, have a contradictory in the field of 
significance, namely, not-anything, or nothing-at-all. This is a 
meaning, as I have previously explained. If the apeiron is emptied 
of all significance it is logical nonsense. It would seem then to be 
similar to the One of Plotinus and of Pseudo-Dionysius in that it 
is beyond both being and nonbeing. And there I will leave it. 
Savery: Possibility and Pluralism 209 
III. THE ACTUAL AND THE MERELY POSSIBLE 
As we have seen, the contradictory of the possible is the impos-
sible and not the actual. Indeed, it is a commonplace of logic that 
the actual entails the possible although the possible does not entail 
the actual. Hence, I shall divide the possible into the actual and 
the merely possible. As explained above, possibility is not an onto-
logical predicate of the actual; it is nothing positive at all. After 
we have established our field of meaning we may then describe the 
actual as free from contradictions. In this sense, and in this sense 
alone, is the actual possible. 
The possible is divided into the actual and the merely possible : 
this is my sixth thesis. It would not have occurred to me to em-
phasize this thesis if it had not been denied by Professor Pepper 
and at least encroached upon by Professor Lenzen. Professor Len-
zen has maintained that the merely possible is prior to the actual 
in the sense that we may say that an actual table is the sum of the 
actual and possible aspects of it. Now, I have no objection to the 
thorough manner in which, both in his book7 and in his lecture in 
this series, he has worked out the procedure of a scientific positiv-
ism, but I do not think he should call possible aspects in any sense 
actual. Such actuality is spurious and not genuine. No part of the 
actual can be reduced to the merely possible. . 
I think, however, that it would be not out of place to make a few 
remarks concerning a present tendency of ascetic renunciation on 
the part of certain scientists. There are mathematical nominalists, 
for example, who tell us that, as mathematicians, they do not know 
that two plus two makes four but only that this proposition is en-
tailed by the postulates of arithmetic. There are other mathe-
maticians, whom I might call ultra-nominalists, who, as mathe-
maticians, do not even know that the theorems of mathematics fol-
low from the postulates. For them, mathematics is only the result 
of the manipulation of symbols very much as certain kinds of 
fabric are the result of the manipulation of needles and yarn. 
Mathematics is a kind of knitting. In both groups the philosophers 
or the meta-mathematicians are left to find out what is true or 
false. Further, we have had positivists in physical science who 
would leave to the philosophers the determination of whether there 
1 The Nature of Physioai Theory. 
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probably are electrons or photons . .And Professor Tolman and 
other behaviorists would generously hand over introspective psy-
chology to the philosophers. In spite of this scientific asceticism I 
think that the general trend of science is in the other direction-
that a sound mathematics can be deduced from self-evident axioms 
since all mathematics is a huge tautology; that the principles of 
· irrelevance and parsimony8 give a genuine probability for the 
truth of the theories of physics; and that the great task of the 
psychologists of the future will be the correlation of the results of 
.introspection with the laws of human behavior. Philosophy has 
given birth to its children, the sciences, and even a kangaroo would 
find it inconvenient to take its adult offspring back into its pouch. 
I am not able to share Professor Pepper's doubt concerning the 
actual. There cannot be possible objects of reference without an 
actual reference, an actual thought. If the thought were only a pos-
sible thought it would be the object of reference ofanotherthought, 
and, if this were possible only, it would be the object of still an-
other thought, and so on ad infinitwni. Since the significant is sus-
tained by the actual, without the actual the possible is impossible 
and the impossible also is impossible. I now feel as though I were 
swimming in the apeiron. 
It seems to me that the first pages of Professor Pepper's lecture 
do an injustice to his previous paper on "Middle~Sized Facts," 9 
since, after all, middle-sized facts are facts no matter how inac-
curately he thinks they are described. I agree with Professor Pep-
per that there is no kind of truth that is not denied by someone. 
Brouwer has denied the principle of the excluded middle, which 
is one form of the principle of contradiction. Mrs. Eddy denied 
the fact of pain, and Sankara denied all facts of experience. The 
White Queen is not alone in having "believed as many as six im-
possible things before breakfast." Some truths, however, seem to 
be certain; I should say, they are certain. It is logically certain 
that a thing cannot be other than itself; that red is different from 
blue; that this patch is extended; and it is certain (although not 
logically certain) that I enjoy listening to Professor Pepper's ex-
cellent exposition of the contextualist theory. 
s "Chance and Cosmogony," Philos. Rev., XLI (1932), 150-158. 
9 Univ. Calif. Publ. Philos., XIV (1931), 3-28. 
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It is certain, first, that there is acquaintance with facts, and 
secondly, that we derive simple propositional functions by ab-
straction from facts, and thirdly, that there is, to some extent, an 
accurate description of facts since we describe facts by means of 
the predicates abstracted from them. What we must assume, 
whether we are contextualists or not, is that we remember the past 
and extrapolate to the future, and that on the basis of these as-
sumptions we reach probable conclusions concerning· the distant 
present. So far as I can see, valid references backward, forward, 
and outward are implied not only by contextualism but by all other 
"adequate" systems of philosophy. I am sure that I have arms with 
which to embrace my fellows, and legs that have walked out of the 
past and will walk, however haltingly, for some time into the fu-
ture. I think it is exceedingly probable that there is an external 
world. 
"A little madness in the Spring 
Is wholesome even for the King, 
But God be with the Clown 
Who ponders this tremendous scene-
This whole experiment of green, 
As if it were his own!" 
My seventh thesis, then, is: The actual may be correctly divided 
into, first, the experience of the duration block, and secondly, the 
actual beyond direct experience, which, if apprehended at all, is a 
part of the field of reference. Thus we return to the direct experi-
ence with which we started. We have made three major divisions 
in the realm of meaning. Before we go further I think it would be 
well to recapitulate in an inclusive scheme. There is a Hindu 
legend that the universe is a vast cosmic egg. We may transfer this 
figure to the entire universe of discourse, which would then look 
something like the figure on page 212. 
The first division (reading from right to left) separates the im-
possible from the possible; the se.cond division separates the actual, 
or the factual, from the nonactual; the third division separates 
the field of acquaintance from the field of reference. This gives us 
four parts. The first (reading from left to right) is the facts with 
which we are acquainted; the other three riarts are the field of 
reference. The second part is the facts to which we refer; the third 
is the merely possible; the fourth the impossible. The. first is the 
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germ; the second the yolk; the third the white; and the fourth the 
wind egg. 
In an earlier part of the paper I followed Leibniz in distinguish-
ing between the logically possible and the com-possible; between a 
proposition which is consistent with itself and a proposition which 
is consistent with other propositions or with the facts. As we pro-
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gressively widen our statements of the facts the possible is cor-
respondingly narrowed. The entire third division of our egg is 
logically possible but we have within it successive narrowings (in-
dicated by lines in the diagram) as our factual data increase. I can 
add nothing here to the account of the stratification of possibilities 
as developed by Professor Lenzen except to say it is not only laws 
but also facts which narrow the possibilities. I shall return to the 
subject of laws later. 
Before ending this section I should like to comment on the use 
of certain words that are synonymous with the word "being" or at 
least closely allied to the word "being." We have the following 
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terms and their opposites: (1) being or entity and not-being; (2) 
actuality and nonactuality; (3) fact and fiction; (4) reality and 
appearance. 
I make no distinction between an actuality and a fact. Indeed, 
it is customary to use, for the noun, "fact" instead of "actuality," 
and, for the adjective, "actual" instead of "factual." Secondly, I 
can make no distinction between a being or an entity and a fact. 
The mock turtle is not a fact; neither is it a being. 
It might be said that an event in the past is not actual but has 
being; but such an event is not a being now; it was a being in the 
past, precisely as the event is not actual now but was actual in the 
past. A being, a fact, and an actuality have for me, then, precisely 
the same meaning. The meaning of being is unanalyzable but it is 
one which all who are not philosophers, and most philosophers also, 
understand. There are, however, other pairs of terms which at-
tempt to dichotomize the realm of being. Such are "existence" and 
"subsistence," and "the natural" and "the supernatural." I may 
not believe in subsistence or the supernatural, but I do not believe 
that they are contradictory. I merely cut them off as irrelevant. 
The pair of terms, "reality" and "appearance," is somewhat similar 
to these latter pairs in its attempt to divide beings into real beings 
and apparent beings. The word "appearance" is ambiguous. It may 
mean something that shows up in experience. In this meaning it is 
a being, as in the New England expression, "The newlyweds ap-
peared in church this morning." In this sense an illusion or a 
dream is a fact. Or, secondly, it may mean that there is the belief 
that something is a being when it is not a being; for example, a 
child believes that there is a mock turtle when there is no mock 
turtle, that is, no being. Such a meaning is false. So-called appear-
ances are, then, either facts or false propositions. Facts are actual. 
False propositions are never actual. In my opinion, it would be 
very much better for philosophy if the word "reality" were dis-
carded and the two kinds of appearance were designated as "facts" 
and "falsities." If the word "reality" is to be used it should be a 
precise synonym for the aggregate of beings or facts. I would not 
say, with Professor Adams, that possibilities are real. I would 
say, it is true that such and such is possible, that is, certain mean-
ings are either consistent with themselves or consistent with cer-
tain designated facts. My disagreement with Professor Adams is 
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presumably verbal. If .AB is customarily followed by T, then .A 
may be said to be a capacity. If AO is customarily followed by T, 
A, in the presence of 0, may be said to be a tendency. I agree with 
Professor Loewenberg that the alternatives of Professor Adams' 
are groups of capacities. None of the preceding lectures has hypos-
tasized a potentia. Mr. Strong's account of the subject seems to me 
thorpughly sound. 
IV. POSSIBILITY AND CHANCE 
I cannot enter here upon an extended discussion of probability, 
which is a far more intricate subject than simple possibility. Prob-
ability, however, may be regarded as a measure of possibility, with 
its two limits, impossibility, or a probability of zero, and certainty, 
or a probability of one. The principle of uncertainty is established 
at present in physics and it seems likely that it will be permanently 
triumphant.10 Assuming the truth of this statement, there remains 
no strict determinism in nature, and chance takes the place of 
laws. Instead of laws we have correlations which are summations 
of chance. These correlations are only probable, that is, possible. 
If we should say, then, as Professors Lenzen and Marhenke did, 
that the physically possible or the biologically possible is whatever 
is consistent with the laws of physics or biology, we should then 
mean that what is possible is what is consistent with another pos-
sibility, and we do not yet reach consistency with the actual facts. 
\Ve must distinguish, however, between the past and the future, 
although in both possibility means consistency with all the data. 
Thus I may say that it is possible that I had mushrooms for dinner 
on August 11, 1925. But it is not possible that I stayed away from 
the Greek play and worked on my paper last Friday evening. I 
may, however, say that it was possible for me to stay away, that is, 
it was consistent with all the other data up to that time. 
We have no data out of the future. In the future everything is 
possible. Everything is possible and yet not everything, for the 
probability, and so the possibility, is a restricted one. If we know 
the position of an electron at a certain instant to a high degree of 
approximation, we do not know where it will be after a certain 
duration, but some positions are more probable than others. It is 
as though we had a die, with an ace on one face, deuces on three 
10 "Chance and Cosmogony," op. cit., pp. 171-173. 
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faces, and three spots on two faces. 11 The restrictions are constant 
and the rest is a matter of chance. We extrapolate the constants in 
nature; the remainder is equality of possibility. We may say, then, 
that a future physical event is possible if it is consistent with the 
past and present facts and the physical constants. Presumably, 
similar remarks could be made about the possibility of future bio-
logical events if we knew the biological constants. I£ new constants 
emerge in the future, the problem is more complicated; and I shall 
not follow it farther. 
V. TRUTH .A.ND FALSITY 
Before dealing directly with the possibility of pluralism I must 
first give an account of truth and falsity. 12 My eighth thesis is: All 
falsity is contradiction and all truth is tautology since the only 
consistent description of fact or meaning is tautology. I shall 
divide my brief exposition into two parts. 
1. Correspondence and verifiability.-It is customary for those 
who have been influenced by pragmatism ( and this applies to sev-
eral writers in the present volume) to replace correspondence by 
verifiability. Philosophy has fortunately sloughed off the extreme 
pragmatism, I might say the pseudo-pragmatism, of Schiller and 
of Jam.es in the second lecture of his Pragmatism. The pragmatism 
of the earlier and the later James and the instrumentalism of 
Dewey is a prediction and verification theory of truth. Truth is, 
primarily, the verification and, secondarily, the verifiability of a 
prediction. Since verification is a process with a terminus a quo 
and a terminus ad qiiem we may adopt a threefold classification of 
the truth of propositions. First, a proposition is true at the con-
summation of verification. This consummation I shall call con-
frontation. Secondly, a proposition is true which will be verified. 
Thirdly, a proposition is true which can be verified, although the 
verification will never take place. (Professor Adams' eating of the 
poisonous mushrooms is an example.13) This we may call psycho-
logical verifiability. Such a pragmatism is not, as it stands, an 
adequate theory even of the truth of extensional propositions, 
11 I owe this illustration to Professor R. H. Fowler. 
12 I have dealt with this subject more fully in a paper, "The Synoptic 
Theory of TTuth," read at the joint meeting of the Western and Pacific 
Divisions of the American Philosophical Association at Berkeley, in Decem-
bel', 1930. I may refer to it as a "possible".publication. 
1s Present volume, p. 10. 
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since we make assertions which refer to the past or to inaccessible 
regions of space or of other minds. These may be indirectly verified 
to some extent in the future but they cannot be directly verified at 
all. They are verifiable only in a Pickwickian sense. We may, how-
ever, generalize our pragmatism by holding that such propositions 
are true provided they would be verified if we could remount the 
past or reach these inaccessible regions. I shall call such verifi-
ability "logical verifiability" and pragmatism, so generalized, I 
shall call "logical pragmatism." 
Such a pragmatism may be easily shown to be the same as the 
correspondence theory properly analyzed. If I entertain the propo-
sition that I was in Berkeley last Friday, this proposition is iden-
tical with the facts. But identity is nothing actual; it is the absence 
of diversity. If I entertain the false proposition that I was in 
Seattle last Friday, the proposition is diverse from the facts, but 
I cannot believe that there is an actual relation of diversity run-
ning from the facts to a mere meaning. When a false description 
is applied to the facts of direct experience I may say there is an 
actual confrontation, but when I describe something beyond direct 
experience the falsity of the description consists only in this, that 
a diversity would be discovered if the confrontation were made. 
The analyzed correspondence theory turns out to be the same as 
pragmatism generalized, and it pragmatism is not generalized it is 
not, as we have seen, an adequate theory of truth. 
2. Correspondence and taiitology.-The analyzed correspond-
ence theory seems to be adequate when applied to the truths of 
propositions of an extensional logic, but unless it is further gen-
eralized it breaks down completely when applied to intentional or 
modal propositions. Their falsity consists in contradiction; their 
truth is tautology. In dealing with such truths the pragmatists and 
the correspondence philosophers have followed different paths. 
The former (James and Dewey) have denied analytic truth en-
tirely. This is an easy verbal solution but it is entirely sterile. The 
latter have invented supposed facts with which the propositions 
correspond. The truth of a mathematical proposition, however, is 
not its correspondence with facts. Euclidean geometry would be 
true were there no ])}uclidean space. If space is non-Euclidean 
there are neither equal nor unequal vertical angles in Euclidean 
space; nevertheless, Euclidean geometry discriminates between 
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them. It holds that the former are possible and the latter impos-
sible. Mathematical propositions are modals. 
We seem to have, then, two meanings of truth: first, absence of 
contradiction in modal or intentional propositions, and, secondly, 
correspondence or logical verifiability in ordinary extensional 
propositions. But a little analysis will show that absence of con-
tradiction is the meaning of truth in the second class also. Most 
ordinary propositions are not verified at all. In such propositions 
both positive and negative verification do not take place. Take the 
classical proposition, "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." This proposi-
tion is not verified, so both positive and negative verification have 
the same status in fact. Neither is actual, but there is this differ-
ence between them: positive verification is not actual, but nega-
tive verification is not only not actual but also impossible. The 
proposition that Caesar did not cross the Rubicon is contradictory 
to the facts. Truth is possible verification; falsity is impossible 
verification. Truth and falsity, in the last analysis, are modals. 
There is of course some difference between the falsity of ordi-
nary propositions and the falsity of modals. In the latter the con-
tradictions are in the data. We may be certain of them. In the 
former we have only a probable and not a certain knowledge of the 
contradiction since the contradiction lies beyond the da:ta in the 
o~jects of reference . .And so of truth. Modal truth is known tau-
tology; ordinary truth is only probable tautology, not certain but 
believed. There is a certain sense, as Professor Marhenke has 
shown, in saying that even modal inconsistency must be sometimes 
sought. Mathematical propositions must be completely developed 
or the inconsistency will not appear. Similarly, inconsistency in 
ordinary propositions must be sought in connection with all the 
facts. This analysis fits the previous account of the stratification of 
possibilities,14 with the one extreme of a purely logical possibility 
and the other of a possibility which is consistent with all the facts. 
In this last possibility the actual alone is possible. Obviously, we 
can never have complete knowledge of the future since future data 
are not at hand, and, except some memories the truth of which we 
accept, we have only probable knowledge of the past. 
To summarize: In modal truth we have, at least in principle, 
14 Lenze11, present volume, p. 57. 
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certain tautologies. In ordinary propositions that go beyond ac-
quaintance we have only the probability of tautology, but if our 
data could be complete we should have no possible doubt and of 
ordinary falsehood we could say : 
"I bet with every Wind that blew, till Nature in chagrin 
Employed a Faet to visit me and scuttle my Balloon!" 
and of truth : 
"Search in and out and round about, 
And you'll discover never 
A tale so free from every doubt-
All probable, possible shadow of doubt-
All possible doubt whatever!" 
VI. POSSIBILITY AND PLURALISM 
Professor Adams has said that the test of a sound philosophy is 
the provision it makes for possibility. With a sure sense he selected 
philosophies like those of Hume and Bergson, in which everything 
is possible, and philosophies like those of Bradley and Bosanquet, 
in which nothing is possible. I think we can now see that the error 
of Hume and Bergson lies in their lack of continuant constants 
which restrict the field of possibility and probability. These con-
stants I have already discussed. I shall now direct my attention to 
the opposite view of Bradley which, by denying possibility, reaches 
a rigid monism. 
There are four and only four possible hypotheses concerning the 
number of beings in the universe. These are (1) monism; (2) con-
catenism; (3) monadism; and ( 4) a combination of concatenism 
and monadism. I shall define monism as the hypothesis of an all 
inclusive being. According to this view, however many beings there 
may be there is one Being which includes them all. There are 
various subtypes of monism. There is mystical monism which de-
nies the validity of all description, and abstract monism which ac-
cepts attributes but denies relations. Since attributes and relations 
obviously exist I shall consider only what I shall call concrete 
monism. I shall define this as the view that there are n substantives 
or concrete particulars and that these are united by an n-adic rela-
tion into an inclusive whole. This whole is a single individual. 
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The other three views are pluralisms. Monadism is the view that 
there are many beings which are unrelated. Each of these beings is 
a monad and the monads are "windowless." Ooncatenism was sug-
gested by the synechism of Charles Peirce and developed into a 
specific theory by William James. It holds that the nniverse is a 
chain of beings or individuals. There is overlapping of the links 
but there is no inclusive being. A fourth possible hypothesis is a 
combination of monadism and concatenism. It would hold either 
that there are many chains, or one or more chains and one or more 
monaa.s. The theoretical weakness of monadism is apparent. Since 
the monads are unconnected, one monad could never know the 
others. Leibniz attempted to save monadism by his "preestablished 
harmony," but this is clearly a dodge since it relates the monad of 
monads to all the other monads. There may be monads outside the 
universe to which we belong. If there are I shall ignore them since 
I can know nothing about them. Similar strictures apply to the 
combination of concatenism and monadism. So far as our universe 
is concerned-that is, the universe that can possibly be known to 
us-either monism or concatenism is true. If concatenism is pos-
sible it is probably true, since the monistic hypothesis would then 
become irrelevant. In monism there is an n-adic relation; in con-
catenism 
all the relations may be of a much lower order-the upper limit of Oon-
catenism would be a world where the highest type of relation is (n-1)-adic .... 
In a monistic universe every entity is related to every other entity. The n-adic 
relation includes all these dyadic relations as a part of itself. It includes also 
all tTiadic and tetradic relations and so on, up to and including the (n-1)-adic 
type, i.e., it includes all the relations that are necessary to constitute a con-
catenistic universe, and many others besides. These additional relations are 
irrelevant in reference to our present state of knowledge.15 
I said that concatenism is probable if it is possible. Bradley de-
nies that it is possible. I select Bradley because he seems the ablest 
of the monists. His argument runs as follows: Let us suppose, as 
in pluralism, that A and B are two nnrelated individuals. It is 
then true that A is other than B; that is, A is actually other than 
or diverse from B. Hence, A and B are not unrelated. Further, a 
relation is a connection; hence, A and B are connected and in their 
15 "Chance and Cosmogony," p. 159. 
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connection make an inclusive whole. Bradley's argument was di-
rected against monadism but it applies to concatenism as well since, 
as I shall show later, in concatenism there is no actual relation be-
tween links even if they overlap. Bradley's entire argument de-
pends upon the assumption that true _relations can never be pos-
sible but are always actual. The validity of his argument depends 
upon the status of possibility. My ninth thesis is : Pluralism is 
possible. 
1. Connection and conjunction.-Bradley offers no evidence, 
and can offer none, that logical conjunction means an actual con-
nection. If I say that Nefretiti was the wife of Ikhnaton and that 
Li Po was sometimes intoxicated, I am not asserting a connection 
between the content of the two propositions. A connection, direct 
or indirect, there may be since the facts somehow belong to what 
we call the same universe. But this is not referred to by the word 
"and." In general, when I make the conjunctive proposition p and 
q, the word "and" refers only to the universe of discourse or of 
meaning. This relation I shall,call conjunction or the "and rela-
tion." I shall use the word "connection" or the term "with relation" 
to designate an actual relation in the realm of being. 
2. Differentia.tion and diversity.-In a similar manner, when I 
think of the conjunc_tion of two prop.ositions in the universe of dis-
course I shall call their otherness "diversity" and shall reserve the 
term "differentiation" for the otherness of two entities that are 
actually connected-for the fact that actual relations, as Bradley 
said, connect things apart. We may make a cross-classification of 
these two pairs of relations, using the neutral term "joining" for 
either connection or conjunction, and the term "disjoining" for 
either differentiation or diversity. The classification is as follows: 
Actual Nominal 
Joining Connection Conjunction 
with and 
Disjoining Differentiation Diversity 
I shall now apply this to the discussion of pluralism. 
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3. Overlapping links.-My thesis here is that two overlapping 
links have the relations of conjunction and diversity in the uni-
verse of discourse and not those of actual connection and differen-
tiation. First, it is clear that identity is nothing positive; it is only 
the absence of diversity. Secondly, there is no actual relation of 
whole and part. We may analyze the so-called relation in this way: 
If W is the whole and P is the part, there is an actual connection, 
r, between P and P', P' being the other part or parts of W. The 
situation is this: Wis identical with PrP'. The relation of whole 
and part, then, is the conjunction of two relations; first, the rela-
tion of identity, which is nominal, and, secondly, the relation be-
tween P and P', which alone is actual. We need glue to glue the 
part to another part, but we do not need more glue to glue the part 
to the whole. It may be illustrated thus : 
w 
p-r-p' 
Now let us consider the relation of overlapping. Let us t1_1,ke two 
links, Mand N, and let us .. suppose that Mis constituted by a r 1 b 
and that N is constituted by b' r 2 c. The relation of the overlapping 
of Mand N is analyzed as follows: Mis identical with a r 1 b, and 
Nisidentical withb' r2 c, and bis identical with b'. The relations of 
conjunction and identity are nominal, r 1 and r 2 are actual. Be-
tween Mana N there is only logical conjunction and diversity, not 
actual connection and differentiation. The situation may be illus-
trated in this way: 
M N 
r, r, 
It is obvious that nonoverlapping links have the relat_ions of 
conjunction and diversity and not those of connection and differ-
entiation. 
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4. Time and space.-Let us suppose that we have a chain of dura-
tion blocks illustrated thus: 
M N 0 p 
Jn this chain there is no actual relation of sequence between a and 
e. If we say that a is before ewe mean that a is before b, and b is 
before c, and c is before cZ, and dis before e. The proposition that a 
is before e is a conjunctive proposition. There is no fact that a is 
before e; there is a conjunction or aggregate of facts. The proposi-
tion that Caesar crossed the Rubicon (before now) is not made 
true by the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon before the present. 
It is made true by an aggregate of facts, the chain that stretches 
from Caesar to the present. Even a chain is not a fact, it is a con-
junction or aggregate of facts. Similar considerations will apply to 
space if space is con,catenated and not an inclusive whole. 
5. Difference and similarity.-Let us take two nonoverlapping 
links of a chain, say the first and the sixth links. We will call them 
Mand R. Let us suppose that M has only one color, red, and R has 
only one color, green. What is the meaning of the proposition that 
M and R are different in color f According to concatenism there is 
no actual relation between the two entities, the color difference of 
M and R is not a fact. The proposition that M and R are different 
in color is a conjunctive proposition. It means that Mis red and R 
is green and red is different from green. Let us take as a concrete 
example the red coat of a mandarin in Nanking and this green 
pencil. Monism may, of course, be true. It is possible that there is 
an actual relation of difference which runs from the coat to the 
pencil, the two facts may be actually compared in an absolute 
mind. The verification of the conjunctive proposition may, so to 
speak, be performed. But I do not need to assume the actual verifi-
cation; I may substitute logical verifiability. If the verification were 
to take place only one solution would be possible. Similarity is a 
contradiction, an impossibility. Difference remains as a possibility. 
6. Diversity and possibility.-W e can now understand the man-
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ner in which two links of a chain are diverse. If we discard prime 
matter as a superfluous conception, two diverse links of a chain 
are dissimilar. If the first and seventh links of a chain are not dis-
similar they are the same link and the chain from the first to the 
seventh link is closed. But whether or not there is prime matter 
two dissimilar links cannot be identical for that would be a contra-
diction. Such diversity holds in the universe of discourse. This may 
readily be seen if we consider :fictions. 
First, let us take two meanings that do not correspond to any-
thing actual: a mock turtle is other than a rocking-horse fly; that 
is, if there were a mock turtle it would be different from a rocking-
horse fly if there were a rocking-horse fly. I can never verify this 
diversity through the actual facts since there are no facts to be 
diverse. But to say that a rocking-horse fly and a mock turtle mean 
the same is a contradiction, that is, an impossibility. 
Secondly, let us consider the relation of a fact to a fiction. When 
I say that a mock turtle is not a turtle I do not mean that there is 
an actual rod of connection and differentiation which runs from 
a turtle which is to a mock turtle which is not. I mean that to 
identify the two is a contradiction and therefore an impossibility. 
Thirdly, the same situation obtains when I am dealing with two 
facts with different sets of predicates which are not parts of an 
inclusive whole. To say that they are identical would be a contra-
diction, that is, an impossibility. But identity is the contradictory 
of diversity. If it is impossible for two facts to be identical they 
must be diverse. They are not actually differentiated within a con-
nected and inclusive whole. They are diverse in the universe of 
discourse. I conclude that Bradley's argument is fallacious. Plural-
ism may be true. 
In conclusion, a word about values. Whether there is an inclu-
sive being or not there is no inclusive good. The satisfactions and 
pleasures of life are manifold, imbedded in a matrix which is in-
different. Good facts are many and the siimmwm, bonuin is not a 
fact. The highest good which we can achieve is an aggregate of 
facts; the proposition which would describe it is conjunctive; the 
truth about it belongs to the universe of discourse. From an actual 
which has come largely by chance we reach toward a possible good, 
"the gables of the sky." God is only possible. 
